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Abstract 
This article explains the main stages and results of economic development in Russia 
since the early 1990s. It describes the process of the formation and the basic features of 
a three-sector economic model, as well as the reasons for its stability and existing con-
straints on economic growth. The authors consider the most likely scenario for the evolu-
tion of the current economic model under steadily declining export revenues. They also 
investigate fiscal and social risks and alternatives in economic policy.
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1. Russia on the economic world map: Achievements and failures
Since the early 1990s, Russia’s average GDP per capita, measured based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP), has increased by 2.5 times, reaching approxi-
mately $24,000 (according to IMF estimates), which places it among middle- 
income countries (Fig. 1). Judging by this indicator, Russia has developed at 
a similar rate as Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, undergoing 
a market transformation over the same period. Whereas high growth rates during 
the 2000s helped to narrow the gap between Russia and developed countries, this 
growth was checked in 2014 and 2015, and the gap widened. The change in tra-
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jectory does not seem critical at the moment, but if Russia continues to lag behind 
“Europeans,” it will soon be overtaken in terms of GDP per capita by rapidly 
developing emerging economies such as China.
Although Russia is now in line with CEE countries on the key GDP per 
capita parameter, it is still subjectively perceived as a poorer country. This 
is because Russia has a higher level of social inequality, which has not de-
creased but increased, even during periods of rapid economic growth (Fig. 2). 
As of the beginning of 2016, Russia’s population could be divided into two 
large groups based on their economic status. The first, accounting for 40% of 
the population, can be conventionally attributed to the middle class (accord-
ing to the Social Policy Institute of the National Research University Higher 
School of Economics). 
The middle class spends less than half of their income on necessities, has 
the opportunity to accumulate savings, and can make consumer choices, includ-
ing the purchase of paid education, healthcare, cultural, and private pension ser-
vices. The remainder (60%) of the households (Group 2) are essentially deprived 
Fig. 1. GDP in terms of PPP per capita (thousand international dollars).
Source: IMF.
Fig. 2. Household income concentration index (the Gini coefficient; 0 –100).
Sources: World Bank; Rosstat; calculations by HSE.
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of these choices. Citizens view this high level of differentiation to be unfair, 
which serves as a potential source of social conflict, especially in the event of 
unfavorable developments in the economy.
Another challenge for Russia is inflation. Although it did drop below 7% 
from 2011 through 2013, it reached double-digit rates again in 2014 and 2015, 
due mainly to the devaluation of the ruble (Fig. 3). High inflation devalues 
savings, while the associated inflation expectations reduce the attractiveness 
of investment, slowing down development in the domestic financial market. 
According to foreign investors, the high inflation rate is the main obstacle hin-
dering investments in Russia — even amidst the acute political confrontation in 
the global arena.
Weak competition in key markets is a powerful driver behind the rising infla-
tion and declining growth in productivity. In terms of this parameter, Russia lags 
behind both European and developing countries; its position has hardly improved 
over the past 10 years (Fig. 4).
Fig. 3. Inflation rate (%).
Sources: IMF; Rosstat.
Fig. 4. Global Competitiveness Index. Competition section (rank).
Source: World Economic Forum.
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This impotent competition is a consequence of the state holding the lion’s share 
of the economy, especially the major companies, many of which are monopolies. 
Russia is at the top of the global rankings according to this parameter (Fig. 5). 
The regularly developed privatization plans have been poorly implemented and 
are accompanied by a reverse process of concentrating interests and control in 
the hands of companies in which the state has a stake.
Characteristically, the state’s extensive involvement in the Russian economy 
and the high concentration of property go together with the large informal sector. 
Different estimates place it between 30% and 40% of GDP (Fig. 6).
The structural limitations listed above were diagnosed by Russian experts 
and economic officials long ago; however, the attempts to remove them using 
economic policy measures, which have been implemented since the early 2000s 
Fig. 5. State-owned share in the 10 largest companies in 2011 (%).
Source: Kowalski et al. (2013).
Fig. 6. Size of the shadow economy (% of GDP).
Source: Schneider et al. (2010).
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(Gref’s Plan), have not yielded noticeable results. Relative success was achieved 
only by Russia’s upward movement in the World Bank’s Doing Business rating, 
which focuses on evaluating the quality of formal procedures associated with 
business activities (Fig. 7). It was accompanied, however, by an apparent slow-
down of investment processes in the economy and the deterioration of its pros-
pects in the eyes of investors.
As a result, the capitalization of Russian companies, which had grown in lock 
step with windfall commodity profits during the 2000s, has declined continuously 
since 2011 despite all efforts to improve the investment climate (Fig. 8). Notably, 
this process started much earlier than the decline of oil prices and the imposition 
of sanctions by the West that cut off access to cheap credit for major Russian 
companies. In fact, we have observed a slight recovery in the growth of capitali-
zation since 2015.
Fig. 7. Doing Business rating (% of the best result, 0 –100).
Source: World Bank, Doing Business.
Fig. 8. Market capitalization of national companies (% of GDP).
Note: 2016 — data as of April 1.
Sources: IMF; World Bank; U.S. National Inflation Association; IMD, CEIC Data; calculations by HSE.
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2. Road behind: A backward glance
2.1. Oil prices
The history of Russia’s political economy is closely correlated with oil prices. 
The Soviet Union started to become a major hydrocarbon exporter in the 1970s 
and 1980s. In 1986, however, oil prices dropped abruptly, serving as one of 
the main reasons for the downfall of the Soviet economy and the significant dif-
ficulties during the transformation crisis after the beginning of market reforms. 
Oil prices remained low throughout almost all of the 1990s. In August 1998, they 
fell to as low as $8 per barrel, averaging only $12 per barrel. In 1999, oil prices 
began to recover, and their growth rate increased to 12%–15% from 2003. Those 
fat years were interrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, which 
caused a short-lived, two-thirds reduction in oil prices. From 2011 to the first half 
of 2014, they remained at their highest levels ($110–115 per barrel), but this was 
followed by a new and dramatic fall, first to $50, and then to $30–40 per barrel 
(Fig. 9). According to international agencies (EIA, 2016), this bout of low oil 
prices may stretch on for a few years.
2.2. Perestroika and reforms
In the 1980s and 1990s, Russia underwent exceptionally important histori-
cal events, the implications of which still define the nature of its development. 
The dismantling of the Soviet system began with political liberalization rather 
than the economic reforms undertaken in China. The political disintegration of 
the USSR led to the disintegration of the Comecon and, almost immediately 
after wards, the common Soviet market. This caused a sharp decline in the de-
mand for the basic investment goods of Russian businesses that, along with 
the liquidation of a significant portion of the military-industrial complex, crashed 
the economy, resulting in the loss of a whole number of industries, including stra-
tegic ones such as civil aircraft engineering, civil electronics, and light indust-
ry. As the economy opened up and restrictions were lifted from entrepreneurial 
activities for businesses as well as individuals, the shortage of consumer goods 
and services increased, thereby devaluing labor income and, to a greater extent, 
Fig. 9. Urals crude oil prices ($/bbl).
Source: Reuters.
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household savings. This created a negative social and political backdrop, which 
distorted the perception of market transformations and thwarted the implementa-
tion of the necessary reforms.
The privatization plan realized in the early 1990s quickly spawned a class of 
“new proprietors” but resulted in a negative attitude among the population and 
firm anti-market stereotypes within large social groups. Capitalism (and the mar-
ket economy as a whole) failed to be equated with fairness.
As household income plummeted, the most important social reforms of 
the 1990s failed. In the end, new conditions developed that defined the paternalist 
model of the social sphere as a steadfast institute.1 Economic and social dualism 
appeared in Russia with a market economy based on private property, on the one 
hand, and a social sphere relying on state-backed guarantees and access to social 
services provided by state and municipal institutions, on the other.
An important feature of the paternalist model is its “multi-shot” approach, i.e., 
the provision of social goods regardless of need. Whereas economic losses from 
this “blind redistribution” were relatively low in the initial stage (1990s to early 
2000s), since the mid-2000s, when the middle class accounted for over 1/3 of 
the population and 2/3 of the pay-as-you-go pensions began to be paid to citizens 
who remained employed, preserving the paternalist model has turned out to be 
unbearable for the economy. The other side of this issue is the mediocre quality 
of social goods (insufficient support for single, unemployed retired persons and 
families with children, the low quality of most educational institutions, etc.).
The state, forced to mobilize constantly growing funds for the social sphere, in-
creased the load on economically active subjects in the form of both taxes and cus-
toms duties, as well as “coercive charity.” This pushed a significant portion of entre-
preneurs into the “shadows,” increasing the share of informal contracts and labor 
relations as the economy continued to grow. The size of the informal sector can be 
estimated based on its share of employment: over the past 15 years, it has increased 
by 1.5 times and is now between 25% and 30% of overall employment (Fig. 13).
This was, however, accompanied by positive processes. The open economy, 
the broad coverage of professional education, and political freedom gave birth 
to the fast-growing middle class whose representation in the total population has 
increased from 15% to 40% since 2000. The measures that encouraged the rise of 
the middle class included an all-important one, i.e., the low, flat tax rate for indi-
viduals, which removed psychological barriers preventing them from increasing 
their income and economic (labor or entrepreneurial) activity.
By the end of the 1990s, nearly the entire economy was built on the principles 
of private entrepreneurship. The first ten years of Russian capitalism, however, 
carried two “birth marks”: speculative business and offshore capitalism.
The greater part of business income was not derived from technological in-
novations or new investments in technology. Its sources were either natural or 
political rent (artificial monopoly) or — especially during the 1990s — reselling 
cheaply purchased assets. This type of capitalism can be called speculative (with 
reservations).
 1 An alternative model existed de facto in the 1990s when households were forced to provide part of 
the funding for education and healthcare in the form of bribes for actual services. It was this corrupt form of 
financing that induced key social groups to reach out for the “right” (i.e. free) acquisition of social goods.
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The impotence of the law enforcement system posed elevated business risks 
during the 1990s. This situation led to offshore capitalism in which the new pro-
prietors frequently moved both legal titles and transactions to foreign jurisdictions.
With extremely limited resources at its disposal, Yeltsin’s government took 
on the role of a liberal player who was only entitled to establish the “rules of 
the game,” but forced to engage in coalitions with private players to implement 
its policies. Both the federal and local governments featured examples of oligar-
chical control over individual areas of the executive and legislative branches.
The oligarchy (“buy yourself a bit of the state”) of 1990s Russia was charac-
terized by two features. First, its interests were of a short-term nature in which 
control exercised over the “state elements” was aimed at obtaining or protect-
ing certain assets or obtaining special legal treatment for a particular business. 
Second, a significant part of oligarchical business was removed from Russia. 
This prevented the oligarchs from taking a firm position in the Russian political 
arena or securing stable social support, even from the emerging middle class and 
all the more from small and medium businesses. Oligarchs made coalitions with 
individual government officials based on the current situation at hand.
2.3. The “Putin era”
Elected president in 2000, Vladimir Putin and his administration had to ad-
dress all of those phenomena. On the one hand, they took measures to encourage 
private endeavors by both businessmen and hired workers by simplifying cus-
toms procedures and introducing a low, flat income tax rate. The legal protections 
for transactions and property also improved. On the other hand, to consolidate 
the state’s role, resources had to be concentrated in its hands after being taken 
from private players who competed with the state. The oligarchs were deprived 
first of political power, then of electronic mass media as the key channel in shap-
ing public opinion, and finally of assets based on the right to manage natural rent.
In the first half of the 2000s, a choice was made in favor of the actual re- 
nationalization of core fuel and energy assets. Resources and revenues in the sec-
tor were redirected to the state (to the federal budget and state-controlled compa-
nies). This served to achieve three objectives:
• restore the function of executive branch institutions, primarily law enforce-
ment. By the end of Putin’s first presidency, the federal government was no 
longer forced to make arrangements with anyone concerning any domestic 
matters (this does not mean that the authorities ceased all consultation — for 
example, in 2006, the Public Chamber was formed and was initially composed 
of persons largely independent from the state);
• increase funding for social programs and public-sector employee wages to 
a required minimum;
• establish government reserves against the potential for falling revenues and/or re-
sources to secure the modernization of the economy and other “national projects.”
The period between 1999 and 2012 is often called a period of recovery growth. 
However, it was only partly based on old facilities and institutions. 
This recovery relied upon sustainable long-term growth in export prices for 
raw hydrocarbons, which secured $2.2 trillion in export revenues for Russia be-
tween 2003 and 2012 (Fig. 10). The rapid rise in the effective demand of house-
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holds for goods and services, the growing state-funded sectors (education, health-
care), and the production of investment goods and services during that period 
were side  effects driven by the enormous export revenues flowing into the econo-
my. Relying on increasing oil prices, Russia’s budget became more stable, which 
improved the country’s ratings and opened up global capital markets to Russian 
businesses and banks.
Was the actual economic development scenario best for Russia? Discussions 
on this topic do not often go beyond the political system. No doubt, economic 
scenarios require a complex and comprehensive analysis, and even so, their reli-
ability will remain quite relative. Nevertheless, we will try to compare two sce-
narios (a hypothetical “oligarchical” and the actual “Putin” scenario) based on 
qualitative factors.
In the “oligarchical” scenario, oil and gas revenues would largely have been re-
distributed in favor of private businesses and mostly removed from Russia; wages 
and household incomes would be 20% to 30% lower than they are now; competi-
tion in the economy would be more effective. One could have expected a bet-
ter cultural and technical level of production and management quality. The price 
and technical competitiveness of Russian producers would have been stronger in 
the event there had been effective demand for their products abroad (domestic 
demand would most likely have been lower compared to the “Putin” scenario). 
At the same time, Russia’s integration into the global economy (as measured by 
the share of international trade and financial transactions in the GDP) could not 
have exceeded the actual integration. Due to a lower effective demand from house-
holds, the substitution of domestic products with imports would have been lower.
The actual scenario lags far behind in terms of the level of competition in 
the economy and in terms of the share of efficient businesses. However, it turns 
out to be more attractive in all other respects. The policy that was pursued during 
Putin’s first and second terms and Dmitry Medvedev’s term as president produced 
outstanding results: labor productivity, per capita income, and the standard of 
living far exceeded Soviet figures; the gap between Russia and the most developed 
countries narrowed in terms of production and social technology; a large middle 
class emerged that provided the foundation for a new stage of economic and social 
Fig. 10. Inflow of resources into Russia from energy exports and foreign investments ($billion).
Source: Bank of Russia.
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growth. Under the “oligarchical” scenario, households would have been consider-
ably poorer with the middle class accounting for no more than 25% of the popula-
tion. However, other structural flaws in the social and economic system of the 1990s 
were preserved and even took shape as standing institutions during the 2000s.
Firstly, the state’s paternalism in managing the social sphere remained, in-
herited from the Soviet era, and even experienced a second wind. The mecha-
nisms of personal responsibility and personal finance, while existing in form, 
are organized in such a way that would-be recipients of social goods make no 
decisions concerning their deposits. All contributions to social security funds are 
linked to employees but are made by the employer and are perceived by recipients 
as goods gratuitously provided by the state (Fig. 11). Households expect the state 
to guarantee and improve the quality of their social goods. These expectations 
form the basis for the electoral demands of social groups. Any attempts at re-
forms that envision a higher level of responsibility from the population are being 
undermined via political mechanisms. In addition to formally guaranteed social 
goods, the state and local governments de facto began to co-finance the mainte-
nance and repair of housing.2 The middle class also became more interested in 
the newly restored compulsory financial security of social goods as the general 
government budget increased.3
The extensive reproduction of the “state’s social paternalism” is having nega-
tive social and economic implications. Russia still lacks a mechanism for the mo-
bilization of private funds to finance social goods, let alone the capitalization of 
respective household savings.
Secondly, offshore capitalism has been preserved. Whereas in other countries, 
attempts to move to foreign jurisdictions are pregnant with tax-related problems, 
the remaining high business risks are still a primary driver in Russia. Assets are 
often removed as a form of insurance.
 2 In 2014 and 2015, with the adoption of a provision in the Russian Housing Code that established the responsi-
bility of home owners for capital repairs, an absolute majority of the regions accepted the proposed amounts of 
respective contributions, which only covered between 20% and 50% of the estimated minimum cost.
 3 This includes state non-budgetary funds.
Fig. 11. Social spending of the budget system (%).
Source: Russian Ministry of Finance.
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At the same time, businessmen removing money from the country look for 
tax havens and countries that offer the simplest rules for registering a busi-
ness. The use of foreign jurisdictions to minimize risks is characteristic of less 
developed economies and political systems than in Russia. As the risk of losing 
property remains high, Russian businessmen have taken up the practice of select-
ing pro jects and transactions that offer returns with a high risk premium.
Thirdly, the inflation rate remains high (exceeding 10% annually in 13 of 
the past 15 years).
These three factors are causing Russian entrepreneurs to demand exaggerated 
requirements to returns. While the generally accepted level of expected annual 
returns to start a new project is between 10% and 12% in developed economies, 
the psychological barrier in Russia would necessitate returns closer to 20% or 
even 30%. Reliable sources of returns this high include natural rent (natural 
monopolies) and artificial monopolies in which the state is not trying to restrict 
the monopoly (e.g., by regulating prices). High returns (and a high risk of losses) 
are also a trait of innovative businesses producing completely new types of pro-
ducts. Additionally, very high returns may result from a medium-term (several 
years) market imbalance, illustrative of the initial stages of market formation 
with weak regulation and high information asymmetry.
3. Three-sector economy and its expected evolution
During the fat years, the economy developed three macro business sectors that 
were integrated differently into the system of relationships associated with deriv-
ing and using oil and gas rent and other resources. Table 1 represents the break-
down of economic sectors by macro sectors based on the prevailing type of 
business (of course, each case has its numerous exceptions). Moreover, part of 
Table 1
Breakdown of economic sectors by macro sectors.
 Sector Macro sector
 A. Agriculture, hunting, forestry Small and medium non-commodity businesses
 B. Fishery, fish farming Small and medium non-commodity businesses
 C. Mining and minerals Commodity businesses
 D. Manufacturing Large non-commodity businesses
 including coke and oil products Commodity businesses
 E. Electric power, gas, and water production 
and distribution
Large non-commodity businesses
 F. Construction Large non-commodity businesses
 G. Wholesale and retail Small and medium non-commodity businesses
 including wholesale fuel Commodity businesses
H. Hotels and restaurants Small and medium non-commodity businesses
 I. Transportation and telecommunications Large non-commodity businesses
 including pipeline transportation Commodity businesses
 J. Financial transactions Large non-commodity businesses
 K. Real estate transactions, leasing, and services Small and medium non-commodity businesses
 L. Public administration and military security; 
social security
Budget sector
 M. Education Budget sector
 N. Healthcare and social services Budget sector
 O. Other utility, social, and personal services Small and medium non-commodity businesses
Sources: Rosstat; HSE.
230 N. Akindinova et al. / Russian Journal of Economics 2 (2016) 219−245
the economy remains outside the market and is mostly served by state-owned and 
municipal institutions — the so-called budget sector.4
The first sector (which we call “Commodity Businesses”) includes companies 
specializing in the production, processing, and transportation of and trade in, 
hydrocarbons. These companies began to generate tremendous profits thanks to 
growing oil prices in the early 2000s. Between 2002 and 2004, the government 
introduced a taxation system for excess profits received from the rent (export 
duties and mineral extraction tax, MET) and thus directed a greater portion of 
oil and gas rents to the budget, which was partly saved in sovereign funds and 
partly redistributed to other sectors of the economy. In addition, the state imposed 
an extra tax burden on commodity businesses to ensure the observance of social 
obligations (supporting employment and the social sphere) and to finance costly 
social projects. However, even with these deductions, the average profit margin 
in this macro sector was approximately 20% during the fat years and noticeably 
higher (by 2 to 3 times) than other sectors (Fig. 12).
The second sector (conventionally called “Large Non-Commodity Businesses”) 
includes large companies in non-commodity industries that sell their products 
primarily in the domestic market. The ruble’s growth in real terms during the pe-
riod of increasing and high oil prices led to a decrease in the price competitive-
ness of their products compared to imported goods. However, the “casualties” 
were not so numerous. Domestic textiles and light industry effectively dis-
appeared, unable to compete with cheap Asian substitutes of comparable quality. 
Other sectors survived in which competing imports came from countries with 
high labor costs. A number of companies succeeded by leveraging the favor-
able exchange rate of the ruble to make technology upgrades and improve their 
competitiveness.
 4 The conventional nature of this terminology is that up to 1/3 of the revenues of education, healthcare and re-
search and up to half of cultural revenues have a market, rather than budget, basis. Nevertheless, it is the budget 
funding that determines the economic type of these respective entities; market revenues act as a sort of additive 
to the budget as the “main course.”
Fig. 12. Profit margin on sales in macro sectors.
Sources: Rosstat; calculations by HSE.
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Those companies achieved average returns of between 9% and 12%, due 
to the increased domestic demand generated by the high oil and gas profits 
flowing into the economy. The additional income for large companies, espe-
cially in infrastructure sectors, was made possible by their monopoly status. 
Nevertheless, the profit margin that could have been achieved in the market 
by companies in the second macro sector was viewed by Russian businessmen 
as low in comparison to returns in commodity businesses and inadequate to 
outweigh the risks associated with the imperfect state of the legal and regula-
tory framework. In other words, businesses refused to invest in non-commodity 
projects. 
Where the state deemed it necessary to implement such projects (housing and 
road construction, engineering, agriculture), private businesses were usually en-
gaged through co-financing or state-guaranteed schemes. These forms varied 
from special economic zones to public-private partnerships (PPP).
In fact, a model was developed over 10 years in which the state acted as 
the agent to redistribute resources between industries in the first and second 
macro sectors. By withdrawing part of the oil and gas revenues from the first 
(commodity) sector, the state redistributed a certain portion of these funds to 
the non-commodity sector, ensuring its participation in investments (construc-
tion business) or simply maintaining an industry (part of the engineering sector). 
The large scale of business in the second sector enabled those companies (not un-
like those in the first sector) to enter global markets to raise credit but also created 
conditions for capital to be removed from the country (Table 2).
Finally, the third sector includes small- and medium-sized businesses, most-
ly in trade and services (which we call “Small and Medium Non-Commodity 
Businesses”), which also obtained growth opportunities thanks to increasing 
domestic demand but without access to state-funded aid programs or financing 
through borrowings/offerings in the global financial market. The small size of 
their assets prevented those companies from engaging in offshore schemes.
According to estimates, the average profit margin in this macro sector has not 
exceeded 5%–6% over the past decade, i.e., it has not even offset the inflation 
Table 2
Features of macro sectors.
Commodity 
businesses
(I)
Large non-
commodity 
businesses,
(II)
Small and medium 
non-commodity 
businesses
(III)
Potential returns 20% and above 9%–12% 5%–6%
Expected returns 20% and above 20% and above 20% and above
Sources of superfluous 
demand / additional 
resources
Rent Monopolism.
Public-private 
partnerships
Tax evasion
Withdrawals by the state 
(in excess of standard 
taxes)
Progressive duties 
and MET.
Extra tax burden
Excise duties.
Extra tax burden 
(including as 
part of a PPP)
Corruption
Offshoring opportunities Yes Yes No
Source: HSE.
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rate. However, the returns of commodity companies served as a desirable bench-
mark for small and medium (as well as large) non-commodity businesses. To 
improve their profit margins, companies in the third sector, which lacked suf-
ficient resources to engage in offshore schemes, used simpler methods to move 
their revenues into the “shadows” domestically. While they carry the greater part 
of the corruption burden, they are also the least protected. The share of informal 
employment in Russia can be used as a measure of turnover in “gray” small and 
medium businesses (Fig. 13).
Regions carry the majority of the social payments burden but lack sufficient 
income. This is an objective factor that induces regional authorities to pres-
sure businesses to acquire the necessary resources for “custom” social proj-
ects, mainly in civil construction, sports and cultural promotion, and religious 
organizations. This burden may reach several percent of a company’s revenue. 
Because we are considering informal relationships, the best tool for analysis 
would be long-term relationships between regional administrations and busi-
nesses that are “socially responsible” and “understand the needs of the state.” 
As a result, the burden is transferred to the buyers of goods and services, 
while the authorities begin to care about protecting the positions of “allied 
businesses .” This puts pressure on competition at the regional level, even in 
the sectors where a monopoly is hard to imagine on a technical level (construc-
tion materials, road construction, retail).
Based on the proposed approach, the indication that the “resource-based capi-
talism” model is nearing exhaustion is the reduction of profit margins in the com-
modity sector, which began in 2012 and 2013 against the still high oil prices that 
soon stopped rising. As a result, the benchmarks for expected returns began to 
fall, killing incentives and cooling down other sectors of the economy.
Thus, the economic crisis currently affecting Russia was mostly caused by 
the exhausted potential of the “three-sector model,” namely, by stemming pro-
ceeds to the economy from rising resource rents. In the course of its redistribu-
Fig. 13. GDP growth and informal employment (%).
Sources: Rosstat; HSE.
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tion, it had been “greasing” the economic mechanism, enabling entrepreneurs to 
run their businesses under high-risk conditions, limited competition, and extra 
taxation, employees to increase their income, and the state to support the func-
tions of long-obsolete social policy institutions.
The sharp drop in global hydrocarbon prices and the economic sanctions that 
“cut off” Russia from cheap Western capital aggravated the economic downturn, 
but their effects were not that strong. The profit margins of companies in the first 
macro sector decreased considerably in 2012, while GDP growth rates slowed 
down in 2013 (Fig. 14), i.e., when oil prices were at their historic highs and no 
sanctions were in effect.
The peculiarity of the period between 1999 and 2012 is the (partial) recovery 
growth in the beginning (during the first 4 or 5 years) and the subsequent develop-
ment under continuously increasing hydrocarbon prices in the global market, 
which pumped continually rising rents into the economy (2003—2012, except 
for the short crisis period in 2008 and 2009). Over these 13 years, the econo-
my and society formed specific institutions that imparted a certain stability to 
the generally fluid situation, particularly in the minds of decision-makers, from 
ordinary citizens to business executives and government officials.
At the same time, the core institutions of the market economy gained firm 
ground during this period of growth. With respect to business:
•	 private entrepreneurship lost its redistributive nature, and businessmen started 
to make real investments;
•	 most companies managed to upgrade their technologies and substantially im-
proved their technological competitiveness;5
•	 the economic and legal culture of market players improved considerably.
Russian companies were willing to operate in a competitive environment, 
which is an essential difference from the situation in the 1990s.
 5 While at the same time, only a small portion of companies faced tough domestic competition and therefore 
had to cut their costs. Labor productivity in the Russian economy still lagged noticeably behind developed 
market economies.
Fig. 14. Russia’s gross domestic product, 1990—2015 (1990 = 100%).
Source: Rosstat.
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With respect to human capital:
•	 a large middle class (up to 40% of the population) developed whose consumer 
activity and its ability and willingness to choose the best quality goods and 
services formed an efficient consumer market within Russia;
•	 practically all working-age youth were covered by professional training 
programs (75% in higher education). This ensured a higher degree of labor 
mobility, increased the requirements of jobs and wages, and facilitated 
the quick introduction of new technologies and new types of goods and 
services;
•	 the inflow of migrants, preserved thanks to the wide gap between Russia and 
other former Soviet republics, brought cheap labor into the economy with ba-
sic and medium skills “on easy terms,” practically without any burden of con-
tributions to pension and medical insurance funds. The 10% share of migrants 
in the employed population also serves as a damper in case of fast-paced de-
velopments in the labor market.
On the whole, Russia’s human capital is potentially highly competitive. At 
the same time, its system of reproduction will be subject to erosion in the near 
future as a result of reduced social spending by the state. However, the negative 
impact of this process will only manifest itself in the economy after 2025.
4. New reality and transition to a new equilibrium
4.1. Basic prerequisites for the transition
The events in Russia since 2012 and 2013 are not a cyclical crisis or the “crisis 
of an outcast,” but rather the economy beginning to switch to a new path, i.e., 
development without a constant inflow of oil and gas rents. The economic and 
social systems need to rebuild themselves to find a new equilibrium. The task 
itself is not nearly as difficult as it may seem. An absolute majority of countries 
have been able to develop successfully under the conditions currently faced by 
Russia. The main result of finding a new equilibrium would be that all businesses 
would operate at normal expected returns. We will now have a look at the basic 
prerequisites for transitioning to that new equilibrium.
First, inflation would need to decrease to 3%–4%, i.e., down to a psychologi-
cally important level that would make it insignificant when projecting future 
prices.
Second, there would need to be opportunities for large- and medium-sized 
businesses to acquire resources for new projects through loans and equity offer-
ings on the stock market. This would require sizeable domestic sources of “long-
term” money . While large companies can compensate for this by regaining access 
to the global financial market, medium-sized businesses have no alternatives to 
“Russian money.”
Third, the practice of extra taxes in the form of “charity charges” imposed on 
businesses would need to be abandoned.
Fourth, there would need to be a noticeable reduction in political and quasi-
political risks for businesses. A psychological indication of their absence would 
be a two- or three-year period during which a significant number of conflicts 
between the state and businesses would be resolved in favor of the latter.
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Fifth, the existing control and supervision system would need to be partially 
dismantled, which is comparable to the “court and law enforcement” system in 
terms of its strain on businesses.6
We cannot hope for the state to conduct quick and consistent reforms to regu-
late the economy (or, for that matter, to radically revise the existing system of 
relations with the business community). Economic policy is the result of actions 
made by a number of elite and professional groups and cannot be implemented 
“at the wave of a hand” even by the country’s leader.7
Below, we consider a scenario of the most inert economic and social policy. 
Truth be told, this scenario is currently taking place. The easiest solution (especially 
when pressed for time) is to act in the same way as before. This at least provides an 
important positive effect for economic players, i.e., consistency and predictability.
What has changed? There is no constantly growing surplus of natural rent 
(in the form of export revenues) and no opportunity to redistribute it to sup-
port the second macro sector and to finance social programs. Does this mean 
that the “bad” institutions mentioned above will immediately cease to exist or 
begin to change? Hardly so, because Russia has certain reserves that will allow 
the economy to “operate as before,” based on the old institutions. This is what 
everybody (starting with the government) is doing.8
This behavior was considered rational in 2008 and 2009 when the objective 
was to survive a bad two- to three-year period. The current situation is completely 
different. Even if the sanctions are lifted (reopening access to cheap capital for 
large businesses) and oil prices rise, the circumstances of 2003–2012 will not be 
repeated. Therefore, we will discuss a development model in which the “reserve 
factor” no longer exists, or the government has successfully stopped drawing on 
it. What would happen then?
As large non-commodity businesses stop receiving regular reinforcements, 
respective sectors (primarily infrastructure, construction and engineering) will 
“freeze up.” Reduced funding for social programs (by 30% in real terms accord-
ing to the HSE) will push down consumer demand and “freeze up” the agricul-
tural sector, food production, and retail. 
In this situation, it is important to recognize when and by what indicators ma-
jor players will realize that the old institutions are no longer functional. This does 
not pertain to formal decisions made by the government, but instead, we mean 
an actual change in mass behavior, including expectations of the respective be-
havior of others. The government’s decisions may provide a signal, but that may 
be insufficient on its own. At the same time, the government may issue no sig-
nals at all, while mass players will receive their own signals based on their own 
transactions and observing the behavior of others. The following factors will be 
prevalent in the coming two to three years.
1. Declining inflation (to single-digit values with a high probability of being 
6%–7%): It is not enough to change business behavior under typical conditions; 
 6 According to the HSE, under the control and supervision system in its present state, business losses account 
for about 2% of GDP every year. According to experts from business associations (OPORA Rossii), these losses 
are much higher.
 7 The implementation of Putin’s Presidential Decrees of May 2012 is an example of this.
 8 An extreme form of the “status quo” policy is the budget cuts in 2015 and — with a high probability — 
in 2016.
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however, taking into account the significant decrease in demand, even the expec-
tation of a 7% inflation rate may provide a signal to lower profit margin require-
ments when assessing new projects. More affordable credit is a real signal for 
the business community.
2. A serious deterioration in conditions that lead to Russian businesses re-
moving their assets from the country: One may call this a blessing in disguise. 
The global attack of mass media and governments on offshore accounts is only 
one of many signals. This factor will also contribute to a decrease in the “required 
returns” for large Russian businesses.
Thus, the prerequisites for dismantling the “bad” institution of exaggerated 
requirements for returns and the inclination towards short-term projects on 
the part of large Russian companies will only be met if the government continues 
its current macroeconomic and monetary policy without sharp turns or a need to 
politically engage the elites.
At the same time, the state’s policy needs to be altered both at the federal level 
by modifying the judicial system and its interactions with the prosecutor’s of-
fice and investigative agencies and at regional levels by abandoning “coercive 
charity ” and, ultimately, projects funded by means other than the budget. Taking 
into account the informal nature of the institutions formed within these systems, 
one can expect the transition to a new state to take at least 7 to 10 years.
The policy also needs to be changed with respect to the third group of pre-
requisites for a new equilibrium. This includes forming national institutions for 
“long-term” money, accumulating insurance payments made by households, and 
investing them in long-term projects by placing the funds in the open market. 
This would require a decision on the part of the government and parliament to 
increase the retirement age and change to a funded pension system. This decision 
will be politically possible in 2018, but its ultimate impact will not be manifested 
in the economy for several decades.
Are there alternative scenarios in the medium term? If we discard speculative 
suggestions and mention only the views that have recently received wide support 
at the social and political level, we could name two scenarios.
The first is to “wind up” the economy with cheap credit, even at the expense 
of continued double-digit inflation rates and a deeper devaluation of the ruble. 
Practically speaking, this is a scenario for non-commodity businesses that aims 
to preserve the old, well-known institutions for their reinforcement but in an al-
tered form and with a new source. We will not test the probability of this scenario 
in terms of “credit pumping” effects. We should note, however, that it would be 
realized at the expense of hired workers and retired persons (thereby destroying 
the electoral basis for the current administration), while its immediate market ef-
fect (i.e., a fall in effective demand of households) would render credit stimula-
tion of supply futile.
The second scenario is more consistent: it suggests anchoring resources within 
the economy through mandatory sales of foreign currencies and a ban on capital 
exports. This model is capable of leading to a new equilibrium in a closed export-
based economy. However, after 10 years, it would result in catastrophic techno-
logical backwardness for Russia.
In our opinion, the above scenarios pose unacceptable risks for the develop-
ment of our country. However, their probability is rather low, as they would 
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contradict the interests of the most influential groups among the economic and 
political elites. Thus, the main trend now is inertial development, i.e., attempts 
to “extend the life” of the dying institutions, as abandoning them would pose 
insurmountable difficulties. A probable prediction would be ten years of stagna-
tion or slow growth in GDP (no more than 1%–2% annually). At the end of that 
period, China would catch up with Russia in terms of per capita income, while 
our country would still lag behind Western Europe. On the other hand, there is 
a higher probability that Russia would have attained a new economic structure 
and more efficient market institutions.
According to the positive scenario, the government would undertake political 
responsibility for any necessary reforms, which would be commenced imme-
diately after the 2016 election. In this case, the transformation would take less 
time (seven or eight years), bringing about an earlier start to economic growth.
4.2. Budget-related issues
The existing model of “resource-based capitalism,” accompanied by perceiv-
ably worsening external conditions, continues its existence via inertia by using 
previously accumulated reserves (the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare 
Fund). The federal budget, however, is becoming a bottleneck against the back-
drop of the recession and persistently falling oil prices. Notably, the regional bud-
get crises have been around since 2013, which has already led to the increase in 
total debt for the regions to RUB 2.7 trillion as of early 2016 and to decreased 
spending in real terms below 2009 levels.
Because the 2016 budget was calculated based on an average annual oil price 
of $50 per barrel, its further decline is causing budget income items to fall out. 
According to the HSE Centre of Development Institute, with an average annual 
oil price at $40 per barrel, the volume of those items will reach RUB 1 trillion. 
The deficit envisioned in the 2016 budget is RUB 2.36 trillion (Table 3), while 
RUB 3.6 trillion remained in the Reserve Fund in early 2016. If spending cuts of 
RUB 0.5 trillion are approved and the borrowing plan is met, there will be RUB 1 
trillion in the Reserve Fund. If the National Welfare Fund (around RUB 4 trillion, 
including currently unencumbered liquid assets) is later used to finance current 
spending, it can be stretched throughout 2017 and part of 2018.
Today, many representatives of elite and non-elite groups are striving to pre-
serve the customary model. In the short run, this will lead to a heightened strug-
gle for access to budget resources between subjects in various sectors and will 
Table 3
Budget deficit and possible sources of its funding in 2016 (RUB billion).
2016 budget 
law
$40 per barrel 
scenario
Oil price ($/barrel) 50 40
Revenues, total 13,739 12,702
Expenses 16,099 15,599
Deficit 2,360 2,897
% of GDP 3.0 3.9
The need to fund the budget deficit out of sovereign funds 2,137 2,674
Sources: Russian Ministry of Finance; calculations by HSE Centre of Development Institute.
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involve officials protecting their interests. The social sector is still losing, and 
consequently, the main burden of the transition rests upon households (Table 4).
However, the budget needs to be balanced over the medium-term perspective. 
The increasing social pressure and the budget situation are highly likely to force 
the government to switch to a flat rate of social payments and progressive taxa-
tion on individual incomes. This measure will bring in extra revenue, but taking 
into account the inevitable escape to the “shadows,” it will not be able to offset 
even half of the current budget deficit. At the same time, a majority of the popula-
tion will view the social and economic system of Russia as fairer.
However, the long-term effect of such a measure would be negative, as it 
would lead to a sharp increase in pressure on the middle class, its growth would 
slow, and the trend in effective demand would be considerably reduced (espe-
cially for innovative products and services as well as for social services). It will 
also restrain the formation of national “long-term” money.
A far safer measure would be to raise consumption taxes to promote future 
growth (from excise duties to local sales taxes). If the Federal Tax Service is au-
thorized to manage customs duties and social fund payments, collectability will 
improve considerably.
The overall economic situation (recession — stagnation — very slow growth) 
will not allow to balance the general government budget at the expense of in-
creased revenues in the medium term. Below are four budget cost items to poten-
tially be cut.
Economic subsidization. The current budget measures taken to support industri-
es and regions are of a chaotic “anti-crisis” nature and are not linked to actual ex-
port prospects. Only two items should remain: transportation infrastructure and 
agriculture. Funds for technical upgrades of production and support for high-tech 
exports should function independently (as non-budget ones).
Costs of the state. Although past experience shows that cuts should start from 
functions and not from people, the overinflated and inefficient executive adminis-
tration needs to be cut down sharply. The main effect of this measure is not so 
much to reduce direct spending as it is to increase tax revenues from businesses.
Social spending. From a medium-term perspective, extension of the retirement 
age and abandoning pension payments for employed retirees will allow budget 
transfers to the Pension Fund to decrease. The transition to a targeted system of 
social aid will also cut expenses to a certain degree (as a share of GDP).
Defense and security. Because of the budget deficit, the state will have to cut 
spending on these items. It would be undesirable to radically reduce the state 
armament program, as it would render pointless the spending already made. 
However, its implementation may be stretched.
Table 4
Comparison of effects of 2008–2009 and 2014–2015 crises.
2009 2015 Difference, p.p.
Sales profit margin (y-o-y, p.p.) –2.0 0.6 2.6
Real average wages in the economy (increment, %) –3.5 –9.5 –6.0
Real GDP (increment, %) –7.8 –3.7 4.1
Budget revenues as % of GDP (y-o-y, p.p.) –3.8 –1.4 2.4
Sources: Rosstat; Russian Ministry of Finance; calculations by HSE Centre of Development Institute.
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To keep its globally competitive strength, Russia, in the medium term, will 
need to increase budget spending in real terms on education and science9, high-
tech medicine, and transportation infrastructure. While making these changes, 
contributions for comprehensive medical insurance will need to be increased. 
Based on the weak political influence of lobbyists in these sectors, we may as-
sume that such a budget maneuver in their favor will happen after 2020. For 
the government to choose the best strategy, it should focus in the near term on 
promoting science and high-tech medicine, where it is required to promptly offset 
a sharp decrease in foreign exchange expenses.
Because the greatest portion of the social burden and socially significant in-
frastructure is carried by the regional administrations and also taking into ac-
count the need to resolve the issue of regional deficits and debt over the long 
term (Fig. 15), the federal center will have to abandon the practice of “one-time 
treats” to the regions (to address the most acute problems) and permanently redis-
tribute a portion of the revenues (1.0%–1.5% of GDP) to the regional level. Due 
to the high inequality between Russian regions, this can hardly be conducted by 
transferring tax sources to the regions, taking into account the social risks. This is 
the amount by which it would be necessary to increase the transfers redistributed 
between the regions.
Thus, the main fork that we will have to pass in the transformation of our eco-
nomic model is related to determining the future share and structure of the budget 
sector in the economy. This will determine the choice of how to balance the bud-
get (Akindinova, 2016).
In terms of ways to reduce and restructure budget expenditures, the following 
should be noted: under current institutional restrictions, a reduction in the budget 
“pie” will allow larger and stronger lobbyists to drive out weaker ones without 
regard to rational arguments about the comparative efficiency of different types 
of spending. Taking into consideration the current power of lobbyists in state cor-
porations and the defense sector, as well as contractors affiliated with the govern-
ment elite, we should expect them to earnestly resist possible “optimization.” 
 9 Currently, funding for higher professional education in Russia accounts for 0.7% of GDP compared with 
1.0% to 1.5% of GDP in developed countries. In the area of fundamental research, our backwardness has 
reached a critical threshold: Russian scientists are participating in the development of less than 5% of subject 
areas and prospective research carried out in the world.
Fig. 15. Debt outstanding by regions and municipalities in 2009 through 2015 (% of GDP).
Sources: Russian Ministry of Finance; calculations by HSE Centre of Development Institute.
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While the state enjoys a reserve of loyalty from the population that will allow so-
cial programs to be cut, it should be understood that reducing the scope and quality 
of budget-funded services is likely to cause future degradation in the educational 
and cultural level of the people as well as increasing disease and death rates. For 
example, balancing the pension system without reform at the expense of the gra-
dual devaluation of pension obligations may result in a return to rampant poverty.
While the scope of spending obligations for the budget system relative to GDP 
cannot be reduced by 3 to 4 percentage points in the near future, a long-term 
balan ced budget can be achieved only by raising taxes. Other options are possible 
in the short run.
The privatization of state-owned shares in companies has long been antici-
pated, although the unwillingness of government officials and managers to give 
up real control is preventing an effective scheme from being worked out. In any 
event, budget revenues from privatization will still be one-time in nature.
The Ministry of Finance may also enter the market with new borrowings, al-
though the high rates would generate spending obligations for years to come. At 
the same time, current budget expenditures would have to be financed at the ex-
pense of domestic investment resources (which are already insufficient). From 
a short-term perspective, this policy may work, as banks and companies enjoy 
a high degree of liquidity that they are not investing due to the negative business 
climate. However, if these funds are invested in government securities, they will 
not be invested in the economy in the future.
As reserves are nearing depletion, another option is beginning to appear more 
and more probable: using a certain form of monetary financing instead of cut-
ting expenses and raising taxes. Apart from the obvious inflation consequences, 
this may lead to an inefficient distribution of resources. As a result of institu-
tional restrictions, strong lobbyists will be the first to receive funding. In 2016, 
the amount of the money issue is conventionally limited by the size of the Reserve 
Fund: the Finance Ministry sells foreign currencies to the Bank of Russia, which 
prints rubles to cover the budget deficit and can sterilize liquidity by reducing 
the loan previously issued to the banking system. When the amount of the is-
sue becomes a subject of bargaining or “political feasibility,” no benchmarks or 
trust in the macroeconomic policy will remain. Subject to the heightened risk of 
capital flight, this policy will almost certainly be accompanied by restrictions on 
foreign exchange transactions.
Whereas in 2014 and 2015 there were still ample opportunities for macro-
economic and, in particular, fiscal policies to maintain “stability” against reduced 
export revenues, the sanctions and counter-sanctions have nearly exhausted 
the margin of safety at this point. We are facing a difficult choice between the vital 
inte rests of large groups of the population and privately owned businesses. If ma-
jor state corporations, the defense lobby, and contractors affiliated with the state 
are not willing to concede their positions, then the monetary mechanisms will only 
allow us to buy some time but will make the macroeconomic risks unacceptable.
4.3. Social processes
The transformation of the economic model will be accompanied by drastic 
changes in the population’s expectations and behavior. The population values 
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 labor income, pensions, consumer prices and social goods, guaranteed by the state. 
Housing and utility expenses occupy an intermediate position: legally, they be-
long to the first group but are actually perceived to be part of the state’s social 
 obligations by both the population and the regional authorities who must respond 
to them.
Labor income and pensions have already taken the hardest blow from the crisis 
beginning of the transformation. They have dropped by 8% to 11% in real terms. 
Apparently, in 2016 and 2017, household income will further drop by a few per-
centage points from its 2013 level. At the same time, the 40% of the population 
with the highest incomes have lost more. This is due to the fact that part of their 
spending is linked to foreign exchange rates (tourism, cars, durable goods), and 
income is mostly denominated in rubles. Their subjective perception of the cri-
sis is stronger than that of the 60% of the population whose foreign exchange 
income is incidental. Most households with the highest income, however, have 
maintained the basic parameters of their lifestyle by switching to cheaper goods 
and services. This points to the unexpectedly high quality of Russia’s consumer 
market, which succeeded in adapting to the price shock caused by the ruble’s 
devaluation and maintained an absolute majority of consumers.10
While the price (inflation) shock in consumer goods and paid services mar-
kets has already occurred and has been overcome by the population, negative 
processes will continue in the area of social benefits provided (guaranteed) by 
the state. As noted above, due to the budget crisis and stagnation or very low eco-
nomic growth rates, the social sphere can only hope to keep its nominal funding 
at best. Thus, in the coming five years, we will have to address the gradual de-
valuation of the state’s social obligations. According to our estimates, the fund-
ing of the social sphere in real terms will drop by 25% to 30% by 2018, i.e., its 
actual resource security will fall back to 2007 levels.
We will now consider what types of behavior could be observed within high- 
and low-income groups under the inertial scenario. They react differently to 
the challenges posed by a devaluation of the state’s social obligations, which is 
not only limited in terms of resources but still provides excessive (in terms of 
income group coverage) social guarantees. The baseline scenario is that the state 
will preserve the principle of the free provision of social goods through state-
owned and municipal institutions (pay-as-you-go pensions, through the Pension 
Fund) until 2018. 
We can expect with a high degree of certainty that the retirement age will be 
increased (abruptly or gradually, depending on the budget situation) and that pen-
sion payments to employed retired persons will be abandoned with exceptions for 
the most obvious cases of “aid to those not in need” (e.g., almost comprehensive 
scholarships for students in the amount of RUB 1,000).
In this case, the quality of state-provided social goods (education, healthcare, 
utilities) will decline gradually. By 2018, this process will become evident for an 
absolute majority of the population. It seems apparent that the better-off popula-
tion group will not object to cutting down gratuitous social guarantees that they 
 10 Tourism is apparently the only exception. Here, the market has really and dramatically contracted in terms 
of the number of consumers. However, the demand that was thus freed up moved into the service sector of 
the cities.
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currently use infrequently (except for secondary schools). However, we should 
expect a “leftist” protest from the more numerous group.
It will be practically impossible to stand against mass social demands backed 
by constitutional provisions. All the state can do in this situation is to prevent 
the “client protest” from uniting with the “professional protest,” i.e., the protest 
of doctors, nurses, and teachers. The state must realize the provisions of Putin’s 
Presidential Decrees of 2012 regarding higher wages for public-sector employees 
(currently, this process has effectively stopped). This will help prevent the con-
solidation of protests from 2018 through 2020, which would otherwise under-
mine the social and political support for the current government.
At the same time, taking into account the lack of necessary resources, 
the state’s ability to make concessions will be extremely limited. This will lead 
to even mass groups of the population actually beginning to solve the arising 
problems on their own while maintaining their demands to restore state social 
paternalism. Due to the deeply rooted Soviet-era perceptions of a welfare state, 
the “scissors” between “leftist” slogans and “rightist” behavior will remain for 
a long time to come.
Starting in 2017 and 2018, households will increasingly begin to replace 
the lacking resources of the educational and healthcare systems with their own 
funds. This process may take on the “wild” form of household corruption, tested 
as far back as the 1990s and early 2000s (when citizens paid cash for “special treat-
ment” for the normal performance of duties by medical and educational workers ) 
or a “civilized” form with a benevolent non-interference by (or even the approval 
of) the government. Examples of the latter include the so-called development 
funds of schools, which actually require contributions to be made (through moral 
coercion from others) with exemptions granted by the parenting committee.
A negative consequence of the inertial scenario will be an abrupt differen-
tiation in the quality of affordable education and healthcare for different social 
strata within the population. Households belonging to the top half of the middle 
class (15%–20% of the population and almost all of them — residents of major 
cities) will dictate the form of private educational and medical services at above-
standard quality.
Indirectly, due to better school training, children from these families will enter 
the best universities, thereby monopolizing the main lifts of social mobility. In 
other words, this would undermine the positive results of Putin’s social policy, 
that have formed the basis for his social and political support.
We can state that even the intermediate result of the inertia scenario on social 
policy will be extremely unfavorable for the government. The realization of this 
risk may lead to the implementation of another, reformative scenario, which is 
based on creating legitimate institutions for citizens to co-finance social goods. 
The effective operation of these institutions will prevent the degradation of quali-
ty in education and healthcare in the medium term, and maintain equal access for 
citizens to social goods.
Key parameters of the reformative scenario are:
•	 transition to targeted social aid based on identifying the truly needy and pro-
viding sufficient support for their social rehabilitation. This should include tar-
geted aid to single retired persons affected by chronic diseases, single parents 
with children (providing for the full socialization of children), etc.;
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•	 priority development of a system of private pension funds, voluntary medical 
insurance funds, and other forms of social savings based on a citizen’s own 
contributions. We need a national program to develop such forms, including 
guarantees for them from authorized state institutions;
•	 the active implementation of co-financing by citizens for social services, sub-
ject to exemptions for families with low income (respective payments can 
be made by social security agencies). An example of this policy is separat-
ing “child support” from education and upbringing and financing this service 
through solvent parents;
•	 the development of competition in social services markets. Admission to the mar-
ket of and support for specialized non-commercial organizations and private 
firms to ensure real competition with state-owned and municipal  institutions. 
This will require mechanisms to offset the current hidden subsidization of 
 “allied” institutions, primarily with respect to property allotment. Competition 
will not only bring higher quality social goods into the market but will also re-
duce the price for the end consumer.
Reliance on the middle class forms the basis for several of the scenarios de-
scribed above. Here, we would like to note a conflict or a potential institutional 
trap. Potential tax reform provides for a progressive tax burden on citizens with 
higher incomes. However, this contradicts the opportunity to develop new social 
institutions that rely on savings or voluntary contributions from citizens. 
Thus, within several years, Russia will face a choice between a “fair market 
economy” and efficiency in the social sphere, on the one hand, and, ultimately, 
faster growth, on the other. This is a difficult choice, as the sense of social fair-
ness is a value in itself. This sense is what most Russian citizens now lack.
5. Political outline of the transformation: Expert survey
The report by Yasin (2012) proposed three scenarios for transforming the cur-
rent model: inertial, a decisive leap, and gradual development. In our opinion, 
these scenarios still maintain their relevance. However, another one was added 
after the 2014–2015 period, i.e., a mobilization scenario that provides for a fur-
ther “crackdown” on the relations between government and society.
To evaluate the set of proposed options in terms of their probability and po-
tential implications, we have surveyed a number of experts working in the adja-
cent sectors of economics, sociology, and political science. There were only 32 
people. However, all of them are qualified professionals representing academic 
institutes and private companies.
To obtain more representative results, a more far-reaching survey could be 
conducted. Nevertheless, we are positive that the coverage of a greater number 
of people provides a basis for judging their opinions and attitudes but not about 
what can be expected. A small number of qualified experts provide better results 
in terms of assessing various policy options and their consequences. Table 5 con-
tains a list of assessed policy options. 
In columns 2 and 3, the experts were asked to estimate the possibility of an 
option being chosen based on two criteria: 1) probability of choice and 2) its 
preference in the opinion of the expert for economic development. A short ques-
tionnaire asks for an assessment of each option’s three types of implications for 
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the economy: recovery (average GDP growth exceeding 1% per year); stagnation 
(GDP fluctuations close to zero growth (±1%); recession (average GDP reduction 
exceeding 1% per year on average). An assessment of the implications is repre-
sented by the opinions on realizing each of these outcomes within 3 to 5 years.
Option 1: the expert survey placed the possibility of choosing the inertial scenar-
io at 45.3%. At the same time, the preferability of this option was estimated at 26%. 
As for the implications of this option, stagnation was assessed with the highest prob-
ability at 53.6%, followed by recession (35.2%). Thus, experts estimate the prob-
ability of negative implications from the inertial scenario at almost 90%.
Option 2: the mobilization scenario (“crackdown”), requiring greater aus-
terity in relations between the government and society, is estimated as 28.3% 
probab le by the experts and as 12% desirable. Thus, the choice of this scenario 
is quite likely; however, its preferability is the lowest. In terms of implications, 
the second scenario was expected to most likely lead to a recession (57.3%), fol-
lowed by stagnation (34.8%). The probability of an unfavorable outcome in this 
scenario was similar to the inertial one, approximately 90%, while the probability 
of success was only 8%.
Option 3: a decisive leap towards radical structural and institutional changes 
and subsequent “modernization from the bottom up” was characterized by 
the lowest probability (6.7%) and the highest preferability (70%). The probabili-
ty of recovery was estimated at 52.9% and that of a recession or stagnation taken 
together at a little lower (47.1%).
Option 4: gradual development was considered 19.6% probable and 67% pre-
ferable. Its implications were assessed at recovery — 47.3%, stagnation — 37.0%, 
and recession — 15.7%. Thus, the probability of success (recovery) for this sce-
nario is slightly below 50% with the total probability of stagnation or recession 
at 52.7%. The experts moved with caution here; the recovery option is roughly as 
probable as the two other outcomes.
The probability of success in the third scenario is viewed as the highest, but 
the probability of it being implemented is the lowest. The fourth scenario is 
Table 5
Expert survey results (32 respondents surveyed).
Option Economic policy option 
(2–3 years)
Economic implications of 
the policies (3–5 years)
Probability 
(1%–100%)
Preference 
(1%–100%)
Option Probability
(1%–100%)
Inertial (continuation of policies 
from the 2003–2013 period)
45.3 26 recovery
stagnation
recession
11.2
53.6
35.2
Mobilization (“crackdown”) 28.3 12 recovery 8.0
stagnation 34.8
recession 57.3
Decisive leap (rapid and drastic 
changes)
6.7 70 recovery
stagnation
recession
52.9
22.7
24.4
Gradual development 19.6 67.0 recovery 47.3
stagnation 37.0
recession 15.7
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more likely to be chosen than the third one, but is less preferable. This can be 
interpreted to mean that the third scenario is the best, but poses higher risks than 
the fourth one.
5. Conclusion
By offering a choice between several scenarios, we hope to decrease uncer-
tainty and provide clear benchmarks for those making decisions today for them-
selves, for their families, for their businesses, or for the country. For political 
leaders, this is only an assumption about the success or dangers that will be in-
voked by their decisions. Our choice of the gradual development option is based 
on the high probability of its (comparatively) successful outcome. This is based 
on the conclusion that for Russian society and its leadership, the best results are 
associated with the development of the market economy and the rule of law in-
troduced to support it. At the same time, economic competition ensures market 
equilibrium, while political competition ensures a balance between institutional 
standards and values, ruling out excessive rent income for individual social and 
economic groups (strata) over a long period of time. Moreover, the inclination 
towards graduality at this stage is based on the concerns that new attempts at 
radical and excessively large-scale transformations would entail radical counter-
measures.
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